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A SIMPLE COMPROMISE:  THE NEED FOR 
A FEDERAL DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 
LAW 
JACQUELINE MAY TOM† 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the credit information of approximately 163,000 
consumers was stolen from ChoicePoint, now a division of 
LexisNexis.1  ChoicePoint sold the information to identity thieves 
impersonating business people.2  The thieves opened ChoicePoint 
accounts by posing as debt collectors and insurance agents, 
giving them access to a large database with records on almost 
every individual in the United States.3  In response, the company 
sent out notification letters, informing consumers that their 
personal information may have been compromised.4  Ultimately, 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Boston University. 
1 Christopher Danzig, Mary Swanton & Lauren Williamson, Breach Patrol, 
INSIDE COUNSEL, May 2009, at 60. 
2 Id. 
3 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., ID Data Conned from Firm: ChoicePoint Case Points to 
Huge Fraud, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at E01. 
4 The following is an excerpt from one of the letters: 
I’m writing to inform you of a recent crime committed against ChoicePoint 
that MAY have resulted in your name, address, and Social Security number 
being viewed by businesses that are not allowed access to such information. 
We have reason to believe your personal information may have been 
obtained by unauthorized third parties, and we deeply regret any 
inconvenience this event may cause you. 
. . . . 
We believe that several individuals, posing as legitimate business 
customers, recently committed fraud by claiming to have a lawful purpose 
for accessing information about individuals, when in fact, they did not. 
When the fraud was discovered, access to information was discontinued 
and the authorities were notified. 
. . . . 
We have set up a toll free number to accept calls from our customers with 
questions and to provide any additional advice and support we can. To 
speak to someone about the information in this letter, please call 1-877-
[number redacted] between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7:30 p.m. Pacific time, 
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more than 800 cases of identity theft were connected to the 
incident, leading ChoicePoint to agree to a $15,000,000 
settlement.5  Since 2005, many states have enacted data breach 
notification laws covering when and how businesses that license, 
own, or maintain computerized data must notify individuals 
whose personal information has been breached.  To date, forty-six 
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands have enacted data breach notification laws.6  Only four 
states—Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota—do 
not have a data breach notification law.7 
Because many states have different notification 
requirements, businesses involved in interstate commerce and 
their in-house counsel are faced with a compliance nightmare.  
They must constantly keep abreast of any amendments to state 
laws that will affect their current practices and policies.  This is 
an extremely difficult task given that data breach notification 
laws vary from state to state.  Variations are so numerous that it 
is virtually impossible to convert these state laws into the more 
manageable format of fifty-state surveys.8  Some surveys 
oversimplify the law, ignoring subtle differences,9 while others 
are too detailed for practical use.10  In most cases, looking up 
each of the forty-five statutes one by one is the only way to fully 
understand the differences.  Such diligence requires a lot of time 
and effort. 
 
Monday through Friday. We hope this information is helpful to you and 
regret any inconvenience this may cause you. 
Sincerely, 
J. Michael De Janes, Chief Privacy Officer 
ChoicePoint’s Letter to Consumers Whose Information Was Compromised, CSO 
ONLINE, http://www.csoonline.com/article/221489/ChoicePoint-s-Letter-to-Consume 
rs-Whose-Information-Was-Compromised (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). 
5  Danzig et al., supra note 1, at 60–61. 
6 A list of the statutes and links to them can be found on the National 
Conference of State Legislatures website, which periodically updates its list as new 
statutes are passed. Security Breach Legislation 2010, NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20100 (last updated Oct. 12, 
2010). 
7 See id. 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 See, e.g., SCOTT & SCOTT LLP, STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (Sept. 
21, 2007), available at http://www.scottandscottllp.com/resources/state_data_breach_ 
notification_law.pdf (breaking down each state’s law into six factors). 
10 See, e.g., PERKINS COIE, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION CHART (June 24, 
2008), available at http://www.digestiblelaw.com/files/upload/securitybreach.pdf 
(describing the major elements of each state’s law). 
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Once businesses understand the law, they must then decide 
how to notify affected consumers.  This decision is difficult.  
Businesses that decide to comply with the law will find that in 
certain situations, some states require notification, while others 
do not.  One option is to send one form letter complying with all 
the state statutes.  If a business sends this form letter to every 
consumer who may have been affected, it could reduce its costs in 
the short-term.  But this method could also lead to increased 
reputational harm because the business is choosing to notify 
more individuals than required by state law.  Many of these 
individuals, having lost confidence in the particular business, 
may decide to take their business elsewhere.  A second option is 
to send letters only to consumers residing in those states 
requiring notification.  Assuming that a business knows where 
each of its customers resides, this option also reduces costs.  
However, it treats consumers from different states unequally and 
may be perceived as unfair.  A third option is to send out 
personalized letters.  This option is the most costly, but may 
preserve the most customer loyalty.  Choosing between these 
three options requires a thorough assessment of the severity of 
the breach, the tenor of current customer opinion, and the costs 
of sending notification.  Businesses that decide not to comply 
with the law are usually given a much simpler choice than their 
law-abiding counterparts.  Most decide that preserving their 
reputation is more important than complying with the law; thus, 
they never notify affected consumers.11  This is especially 
alarming in cases where it is difficult to trace the breach back to 
the records of a particular business.12  In such cases, it is 
impossible to hold the business liable, so consumers remain 
unaware that their identities are at risk. 
The fact that a federal law would simplify matters has not 
gone unnoticed.  The 109th Congress was extremely active in 
trying to get a federal law passed.  “At the close of 2005, there 
were at least seven House and Senate committees working on 
 
11 This phenomenon is referred to in one paper as the “disclosure disincentive.” 
Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, Anonymous Disclosure of Security Breaches: 
Mitigating Harm and Facilitating Coordinated Response, in SECURING PRIVACY IN 
THE INTERNET AGE 223, 234 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008). According to this 
theory, businesses will decide not to disclose in two instances. Id. The first is when 
they do not want to harm their reputation, and the second is when it is impossible to 
trace the breach back to them. Id. 
12 See id. 
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federal legislation directly addressing what organizations should 
do when individuals’ personal and private data has been illegally 
accessed.”13  However, “all of the bills were mired down in 
committees by turf wars and intense lobbying.”14  None became 
law.  The 110th Congress took steps to pass a bill, but it, too, was 
unable to succeed.15  There was also activity in the 111th 
Congress.  Among the bills circulating were the Data Breach 
Notification Act (S. 139),16 the Personal Data Security and 
Privacy Act (S. 1490),17 the Data Security Act of 2010 (S. 3579),18 
the Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2010 (S. 3742),19 
and the Data Accountability and Trust Act (H.R. 2221).20  S. 139, 
S. 1490, and H.R. 2221 were all approved by their respective 
committees in the House and Senate.  The House passed H.R. 
2221 in December 2009.  S. 3579 and S. 3742 were introduced 
most recently in the summer of 2010.  None of these bills became 
law.  
Despite all this congressional activity, whether the 112th 
Congress will pass a federal data breach notification law remains 
uncertain.  Similar bills will likely face the same obstacles from 
lobbyists as their predecessors in previous sessions.  Consumer 
 
13 Samuel Lee, Note, Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and 
Data Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 125, 136 (2006) (citing Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2005, S. 1789 109th Cong. (2005); Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 
1408, 109th Cong. (2005); Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1326, 109th 
Cong. (2005); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005); 
Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005); Information 
Protection and Security Act, H.R. 1080, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong.; Consumer Data Notification and 
Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong). 
14 Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of 
Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 157 (2006). 
15 See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong.; 
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong.; Data 
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); Cyber-Security 
Enhancement and Consumer Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th Cong. 
16 Data Breach Notification Act, S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009). 
17 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009). 
18 Data Security Act of 2010, S. 3579, 111th Cong. 
19 Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2010, S. 3742, 111th Cong. 
20 Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009). Another 
recently proposed bill, Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility 
Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and 
Safeguards Act, not discussed in this Note, is very different from the bills already 
mentioned, explicitly refusing to preempt state data breach notification laws. H.R. 
5777, 111th Cong. § 605(c) (2010).  
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protection groups and their opponents do not show signs of 
backing down.21  Before taking office in 2009, President Barack 
Obama and his transition team attempted to restrict lobbyists in 
Washington, D.C.22  Even so, lobbyists’ influence remains 
strong.23  In 2009, the financial services industry alone spent over 
$220 million on lobbying efforts.24  Between November 2008 and 
March 2009, “more than 2,000 cities, companies, and 
associations . . . hired lobbyists to help them push their agendas 
on Capitol Hill and at the White House, easily outpacing such 
numbers after the previous two elections.”25  Thus, lobbyists’ 
potential impact on a federal data breach notification law cannot 
be ignored. 
While the debate among industry lobbyists rages on, security 
breaches continue to take place.  Cybercriminals are adapting to 
the changing market for stolen data, targeting not only people’s 
most vulnerable data but also their most valuable.26  According to 
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a nonprofit consumer 





21 See Letter from Ctr. for Digital Democracy et al. to Energy & Commerce 
Comm. Member (Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Letter on H.R. 2221], available at 
http://www.privacylives.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hr2221preemption29sept09 
.pdf (letter from various consumer protection groups); Letter from Am. Ass’n of 
Adver. Agencies et al. to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. & Jeff 
Sessions, Ranking Member, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Letter 
on S. 1490], available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/letter-s-
1490-personal-data-privacy-and-security-act-2009 (letter from various business 
groups on the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490).  
22 For example, President Obama’s transition team prohibited registered 
lobbyists who had lobbied during the previous twelve months from working in the 
policy areas on which they lobbied. See Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama’s 
Transition Team Restricts Help of Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A19. 
23 See Stephen Labaton, Lobbyists Mass to Try To Shape Financial Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at B1 (“Even though President Obama vowed to change the 
culture of corporate influence on Washington, the administration has contributed, 
albeit inadvertently, to making this a banner year for lobbyists.”). 
24 See id. 
25 Ellen Nakashima & Brady Dennis, In a Down Time Everywhere Else, K Street 
Bustles; Lobbyists Find Plenty of Work as Clients Contend for Stimulus Package’s 
Billions, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2009, at A12. 
26 See WADE H. BAKER ET AL., VERIZON BUSINESS, 2009 DATA BREACH 
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (2009), http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/ 
security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf. In 2009, it seems that the most sought 
after data were Personal Identification Numbers (“PIN”) information. See id. 
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records in the United States were compromised between 2005 
and January 2011.27  Even the President of the United States has 
been a victim.28   
Clearly, it is time for legislators in Congress to reach a 
compromise.  This Note argues that a strict federal data breach 
notification law would not only appease businesses tired of 
having to comply with forty-six different state laws but would 
also increase incentives for businesses to disclose by reducing the 
cost of compliance and increasing the reputational risk 
associated with security breaches.  Part I of this Note examines 
the current state of the law by exploring the elements of a data 
breach notification law.  This Part will compare various state 
laws to the bills considered by the 111th Congress.  Part II 
analyzes lobbyists’ differing perspectives on the possibility of a 
federal data breach notification law that preempts the state laws 
currently in place.  Taking into account all of these perspectives, 
Part III draws conclusions regarding the form a federal data 
breach notification law should take and focuses on giving 
consumers increased control over the security of their own 
personal data.  
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
A. The Legal Landscape 
In 2003, businesses were required to comply with only one 
state data breach notification law—California’s Database Breach 
Notification Security Act.29  This law was the first of its kind and 
is the model for many other data breach notification laws in the 
United States.30  California’s statute remained the only data 
breach notification law until March 31, 2005, when a similar 
statute was passed in Arkansas.31   
 
27 A chronology of data breaches is available at Chronology of Data Breaches, 
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last 
updated Jan. 31, 2011). 
28 In 2008, three State Department employees opened President Obama’s 
electronic passport file, violating the Department’s privacy rules. See Helene Cooper, 
State Dept. Finds Breaches of Obama’s File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at A19.  
29 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2010). 
30 See Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. & Scott D. Hansen, Identity Theft Litigation: A 
Roadmap for Defense and Protection, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 563, 575.  
31 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to 108 (2010). 
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After the enactment of California’s statute, businesses 
involved in interstate commerce had to decide whether to do just 
the bare minimum or whether to go beyond California’s statutory 
requirements.32  For instance, consider the situation in which a 
business that does not store customers’ mailing addresses suffers 
a security breach.  California’s statute requires notification to 
California residents.33  Determining whether a customer is a 
resident of California at the time of the breach would require this 
business to collect more information than it otherwise would 
have, thereby increasing the cost of doing business.34  However, 
going beyond the requirements of the statute by notifying all of 
the affected customers could have unintended consequences on 
consumer opinion.  Giving too many details about a possible 
breach to too many people could lead to a loss of consumer loyalty 
and a reduction in business. 
California’s use of vague and indefinite language—a by-
product of legislators’ ignorance regarding computers, the 
Internet, and technology—did not help businesses in making this 
decision.35  Phrases in California’s statute such as “reasonably 
believed”36 and “in the most expedient time possible”37 are vague 
and subject to interpretation.38  The California legislature’s 
failure to define these terms, as well as technical terms such as 
“encrypted,” has left businesses uncertain as to whether the 
strength of their security policies is in proportion to the 
sensitivities of the types of data they collect.39  
Businesses operating today must deal with the same 
questions as their counterparts in 2003; however, because many 
states have adjusted their statutes to rectify what they see as 
weaknesses in California’s statutory language, the legal  
 
 
environment has become much more complicated.  State 
 
32 See Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security 
Act: The First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for 
National Identity Theft Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2003). 
33 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a). 
34 See Skinner, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
35 See id. at 8. 
36 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a). 
37 Id. 
38 See Brandon Faulkner, Note, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 
FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1110–11 (2007).  
39 See Skinner, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
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legislatures’ attempts to rectify California’s vague language have 
created a myriad of laws with differing requirements. 
Any of the bills proposed in the 111th Congress would reduce 
the complicated statutory structure currently in place by 
preempting all of these state laws.40  S. 139 and S. 1490 (“Senate 
bills”) and H.R. 2221 were all introduced in previous sessions of 
Congress.41  The two Senate bills have identical sections on 
notification.42  H.R. 2221 and S. 3742 (“House-Senate bills”) also 
have identical language on notification, with a few minor 
differences.43  S. 3579 has the least comprehensive notification 
provision of them all, leaving much to federal agencies to 
regulate.44   
These bills did not just suddenly appear.  Senator Diane 
Feinstein of California introduced S. 139 back in 2003, soon after 
California’s law was enacted.45  She continues to support the bill, 
emphasizing that the threat of identity theft is growing and can 
no longer be ignored.46  Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont first 
introduced S. 1490 in 2005 with “high hopes of bringing urgently 
needed data privacy reforms to the American people.”47  H.R. 
2221 was first introduced in the 109th Congress48 and has since 
passed in the House.49  If bills such as these have been on 
 
40 These bills require more than just notification in the event of a security 
breach. For instance, S. 1490 requires the implementation of data security programs 
and increased penalties for identity theft. See S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009). However, 
analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this Note, which only examines 
the requirement of notification in the event of a data breach.  
41 See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong.; 
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong.; Data 
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007). 
42 See S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 311 (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
43 See S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
44 See S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010). 
45 155 CONG. REC. S7871 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Diane 
Feinstein). 
46 Id. (“According to a report by the Identity Theft Resource Center, the news 
media reported more than 620 breaches involving personal information during 2008. 
That works out to about one data security breach every 14 hours—and those are just 
the ones that are big enough to be covered in the media.”). 
47 155 CONG. REC. S7871 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy). 
48 The Data Accountability and Trust Act: Hearing on H.R. 2221 and H.R. 1319 
Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of 
Rep. Bobby L. Rush). 
49 H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2221. 
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Congress’s agenda since 2003, why is it taking so long for 
Congress to pass a data breach notification law? 
As will be discussed in further detail below, data breach 
notification laws failed to pass in previous sessions of Congress 
because critics believe that many of the same deficiencies that 
plague California’s law are also present in the federal bills.  In 
order to understand these criticisms, it is necessary to first 
analyze the main elements of a data breach notification law. 
B. The Elements of a Data Breach Notification Law 
Every data breach notification law attempts to address the 
following major subjects: (1) the definition of “security breach” 
and the element of harm; (2) the definition of “personal 
information”; (3) who must be notified and when delivery must be 
completed; (4) how individuals must be notified and what 
information must be included in the notification; and (5) the 
penalties for failing to notify affected individuals.  As will be 
discussed below, slight differences in language have a great 
impact on what businesses are required to do in the event of a 
security breach. 
1. The Definition of a “Security Breach” and the Element of 
Harm 
Whether to include the element of harm in the definition of 
“security breach” is the central issue in the debate over any data 
breach notification law.  Many states have struggled with the 
fact that California’s statute requires no additional element of 
harm to trigger notification.50  Instead, the California statute 
defines “security breach” as the “unauthorized acquisition of 
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality, 
or integrity of personal information maintained by 
the . . . business.”51  The trigger for notification is based on 
acquisition alone.  Unauthorized acquisition or a “reasonable 
belief” that unauthorized acquisition has occurred is enough for  
 
the statute’s notice requirements to apply.52  Critics say that this 
 
50 See Brendan St. Amant, Recent Development, The Misplaced Role of Identity 
Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505, 
520–25 (2007). 
51 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West 2010). 
52 Id. § 1798.82(a). 
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could trigger over-notification, desensitizing the public to the 
severity of security breaches.53 
New York has taken a different approach.  While it does not 
require an additional element of harm, it does list several  
factors that can be used by businesses to determine “whether 
information has been acquired, or is reasonably believed to have 
been acquired, by an unauthorized person.”54  The factors are:  
(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession 
and control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen 
computer or other device containing information; or 
(2) indications that the information has been downloaded or 
copied; or (3) indications that the information was used by an 
unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or 
instances of identity theft reported.55 
Thus, New York has taken a middle-of-the road approach; it has 
elaborated upon California’s law but has stopped short of 
requiring harm. 
In contrast, states such as Louisiana, Missouri, and North 
Carolina have elected to add an additional element of harm, 
deciding that a risk of harm rather than an unauthorized 
acquisition should be the trigger for notification.  In these states, 
notification is not required when businesses determine that 
identity theft is not likely to result,56 “where illegal use of the 
personal information has [not] occurred or is [not] reasonably 
likely to occur or [where the breach] creates [no] material risk of 
harm to a consumer.”57 
Currently, businesses conducting interstate commerce that 
want to comply with all of the state notification laws can send 
letters to every individual whose personal information has been 
acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by an 
unauthorized person, regardless of whether or not there is a 
significant risk of harm.  In doing so, they choose the broadest 
trigger—California’s trigger of unauthorized acquisition.58  If 
they choose the broadest trigger, businesses do not need to 
ascertain whether each state’s statutory language includes an 
element of harm, saving them both time and money.  Thus, 
 
53 See Skinner, supra note 32, at 8–9. 
54 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2010). 
55 Id. 
56 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074(G) (2010). 
57 Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(14) (2010).  
58 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010). 
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despite each state’s attempt to limit unnecessary notification of 
consumers, among businesses conducting interstate commerce, 
there is really only one trigger—California’s trigger. 
The federal bills hoped to change this state of affairs.  
Although they do not significantly change California’s definition 
of “security breach,” they do include an additional element of 
harm.  The Senate bills’ definition is very similar to California’s 
definition, defining “security breach” as a “compromise of the 
security, confidentiality, or integrity of computerized data 
through misrepresentation or actions that result in, or there is a 
reasonable basis to conclude has resulted in, acquisition of or 
access to [personal information] that is unauthorized or in excess 
of authorization.”59  Notification, however, is not required  
if a business: (1) conducts a “risk assessment” that 
“concludes . . . there is no significant risk that a security breach 
has resulted in, or will result in, harm to the individuals whose 
sensitive personally identifiable information was subject to the 
security breach”; (2) sends the results of the assessment to the 
Secret Service; and (3) receives no indication from the Secret 
Service that notification should still be given.60  There is a 
presumption that there is no “significant risk” where information 
was encrypted or redacted.61 
The House-Senate bills’ definition is even simpler than the 
Senate bills’, defining “security breach” rather simply as 
“unauthorized access to or acquisition of data in electronic form 
containing personal information.”62  No notification is required 
where the entity determines “that there is no reasonable risk of 
identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct.”63  Once again, 
there is a presumption of no “reasonable risk” if the breached 
data is protected by encryption.64 
S. 3579 adds significantly to this discussion, defining “breach 
of data security” as “the unauthorized acquisition of sensitive 
account information or sensitive personal information,” while 
also including an exception for encrypted information.65  
 
59 S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(11)(A) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(6)(A) (2009). 
60 S. 1490 § 312(b)(1); S. 139 § 3(b)(1).  
61 S. 1490 § 312(b)(1); S. 139 § 3(b)(2). For a definition of “encryption,” see infra 
note 88 and accompanying text. 
62 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 5(1) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 5(1) (2009). 
63 S. 3742 § 3(f)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(f)(1). 
64 S. 3742 § 3(f)(2)(A); H.R. 2221, § 3(f)(2)(A). 
65 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2010). 
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Notification is required only if, after an investigation, the entity 
determines that the breach is “reasonably likely to be misused in 
a manner causing substantial harm or inconvenience.”66  The bill 
even goes so far as to define the term “substantial harm or 
inconvenience” as “material financial loss to, or civil or criminal 
penalties imposed on, a consumer . . . ; or . . . the need for a 
consumer to expend significant time and effort to correct 
erroneous information relating to the consumer . . . , in order to 
avoid material financial loss, increase costs, or civil or criminal 
penalties.”67  The term does not include having to change an 
account number, and the harm must result from “identity theft 
or account fraud.”68 
2. The Definition of “Personal Information” 
Like the term “security breach,” the term “personal 
information” is highly debated.  In California, “personal 
information” is defined as “an individual’s first name or first 
initial and last name in combination with any” of the following: 
(1) a social security number; (2) a driver’s license number or 
California identification card number; (3) an “[a]ccount number, 
credit or debit card number, in combination with any required 
security code, access code, or password that would permit access 
to [the] individual’s financial account”; and (4) medical or health 
insurance information.69  In addition, either the individual’s 
name or the information accompanying the individual’s name 
must be “unencrypted.”70  The statute does not define the term 
“encrypted.”71 
This definition raises two issues.  The first issue is whether 
the statute should cover only computerized data.72  The Senate 
bills and the House-Senate bills apply only to computerized or 
electronic data.73  S. 3579 makes no such distinction.74  Some 
states have expanded their statutes to cover more than just 
 
66 Id. § 3(b)–(c). 
67 Id. § 2(11)(A). 
68 Id. § 2(11)(B). 
69 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2010). 
70 Id. 
71 See § 1798.82. 
72 See Skinner, supra note 32, at 10. 
73 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2010); S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(11)(A) (2009); 
H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(6)(A) (2009). 
74 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2010). 
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computerized data.  For example, Indiana’s statute “includes the 
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that have been 
transferred to another medium, including paper, microfilm, or a 
similar medium, even if the transferred data are no longer in a 
computerized format.”75  Similarly, Massachusetts, which has 
passed one of the most progressive state privacy laws in the 
United States,76 expanded its statute even further, covering 
“[a]ny material upon which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or 
electromagnetic information or images are recorded or preserved, 
regardless of physical form or characteristics.”77 
The second issue is whether California’s definition of 
“personal information” is broad enough to protect consumers 
from identity theft.78  New York has adopted a broader definition 
than California’s, defining “personal information” as “any 
information concerning a natural person which, because of name, 
number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used to 
identify such natural person.”79  However, the end result is not 
much different.  New York distinguishes between “personal 
information” and “private information,” the latter being defined 
in the same way California defines “personal information.”80  
Because the statute applies only to businesses in possession of 
“private information,”81 New York has not really altered 
California’s original definition.  Other states have been more 
progressive, opting to make specific additions to their statutes, 
including information such as taxpayer identification numbers, 
biometric data, and mothers’ maiden names, in their lists of 
protected data.82 
 
75 IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-2 (2010). Indiana also carves out a special exception for 
electronic data on portable devices, such as laptops, providing that a security breach 
“does not include . . . [u]nauthorized acquisition of a portable electronic device on 
which personal information is stored, if all personal information on the device is 
protected by encryption and the encryption key.” Id. 
76 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1 (2010); see also Danzig et al., supra note 1, at 
64. 
77 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1. 
78 See Amant, supra note 50, at 525–26. 
79 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2010). 
80 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-
aa(1)(b). 
81 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2)–(3). 
82 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(1)(iv) (LexisNexis 2010); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5)(e) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(2)(a)(6) (2010). 
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Supporters of the federal bills agree that California’s 
definition is too narrow.  The House-Senate bills define “personal 
information” as “an individual’s first name or initial and last 
name, or address, or phone number, in combination with any 
[one] or more of the following”:  (1) a social security number; (2) a 
driver’s license or other state identification number; or (3) a 
“[f]inancial account number or credit or debit card number, and 
any required [code or password].”83  Although this definition is 
very similar to California’s definition, the bill leaves room for 
some flexibility, stating that the definition of “personal 
information” may be modified by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) “to accommodate changes in technology or practices.”84  
The Senate bills go a bit further, deciding instead to make 
specific additions to the definition.  Among the additions are a 
“passport number, or alien registration number, . . . [and] 
biometric data.”85  Any two of the following would also suffice in 
combination with the individual’s name: (1) a “[h]ome address or 
telephone number”; (2) “[m]other’s maiden name”; or 
(3) “[m]onth, day, and year of birth.”86  S. 3579 adds taxpayer 
identification numbers to its list of protected data.87 
The federal bills also set forth another improvement—all of 
them, with the exception of S. 3579, offer a definition of 
encryption.  The Senate bills and the House-Senate bills define 
encryption as “the protection of data in electronic form in storage 
or in transit using an encryption technology that has been 
adopted by an established standards setting body which  
renders such data indecipherable in the absence of associated 
cryptographic keys.”88  This definition provides consumers with 
more protection by precluding businesses from arguing that a 
simple eight-character password qualifies as encryption. 
3. Who Must Be Notified and When Delivery Must Be 
Completed 
With respect to both the “who” and the “when,” data breach 
notification laws distinguish between businesses that own or 
 
83 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 5(9)(A) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 5(7)(A) (2009). 
84 S. 3742 § 5(9)(B); H.R. 2221 § 5(7)(B). 
85 S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(7) (2009); S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(12) (2009). 
86 S. 139 § 13(7); S. 1490 § 3(12). 
87 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 2(10)(A) (2010).  
88 S. 3742 § 5(5); S. 1490 § 3(7); H.R. 2221 § 5(4); S. 139 § 13(4). 
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license personal information (“Owners”) and businesses that 
maintain personal information that is owned and licensed by 
others (“Maintainers”).  This distinction is made, presumably, to 
prevent any confusion over which entity is responsible for giving 
notice in the event that both entities are victims of the same 
breach.  For instance, California’s law provides that following the 
occurrence of a security breach, Owners must notify “any 
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information 
was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person,”89 while Maintainers need only inform “the 
owner or licensee of the information” in question.90 
The Senate bills and the House-Senate bills also distinguish 
between Owners and Maintainers.  Like California, the House-
Senate bills require a Maintainer to notify only the Owner.91  
Owners, on the other hand, must “notify each individual who is a 
citizen or resident of the United States whose personal 
information was acquired or accessed as a result of such a breach 
of security.”92  The Senate bills are very different.  Unless an 
agreement is made between the Owner and the Maintainer, the 
Maintainer must notify both the Owner and any affected 
residents, or risk violating the act.93  The Maintainer is only 
relieved of this duty when the Owner notifies the affected 
individuals first.94  Presumably, should one of the Senate bills 
pass, most Owners and Maintainers would amend their contracts 
to make it clear which entity is responsible for sending notice 
because clarifying this separation of duties would avoid confusion 
and help protect the parties from liability.  The language of S. 
3579 does not distinguish between Owners and Maintainers.  
Instead, both Owners and Maintainers are considered “covered 
entit[ies]” and must notify “all consumers to whom the [personal 
information] relates.”95  
In addition to notifying affected consumers, many states also 
require entities to notify a consumer reporting agency when a 
certain threshold number of individuals has been affected to 
allow for the maintenance of information on such breaches at a 
 
89 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010). 
90 Id. § 1798.82(b). 
91 S. 3742 § 3(b)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(b)(1). 
92 S. 3742 § 3(a)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(a)(1). 
93 S. 1490 § 311(a)–(b); S. 139 § 2(a)–(b).  
94 S. 1490 § 311(b)(3); S. 139 § 2(b)(3). 
95 See S. 3579, 111th Cong. §§ 2(7)(A), 3(c)(1) (2010).  
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national level.96  The Senate bills and S. 3579 include similar 
provisions.  If over 5,000 individuals have been affected by a 
breach, notice must also be given to consumer reporting 
agencies.97  The House-Senate bills have no comparable 
provision. 
In certain circumstances, some states also require that 
parties inform the state attorney general.98  At the state level, 
private sector lobbyists have succeeded in states such as Indiana, 
where they were able to block an amendment that would have 
required notification to the state attorney general, who could 
then post information regarding the breach on a website.99  
“Lobbyists decried the provision, claiming it would provide 
phishers a golden opportunity to prey on unsuspecting 
consumers.  The phishers would use the site against its intended 
purpose, lobbyists argued, by targeting visitors and getting them 
to input personal information.”100  Microsoft, AT&T, and Verizon 
were among those objecting to the Indiana bill.101  Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger of California blocked a similar 
amendment in October 2010.102 
In addition to consumers and consumer reporting agencies, 
other entities must be notified as well.  The House-Senate bills 
require that Owners notify the FTC;103 the Senate bills require 
business to notify the United States Secret Service and the 
 
96 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12) (2005). A consumer reporting agency is an 
“agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis.” 
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p) (2006). It must “regularly engage[ ] in the practice of 
assembling . . . and maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to 
third parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit 
capacity, each of the following . . . : (1) [p]ublic record information [and] (2) [c]redit 
account information.” Id. 
97 S. 3579 § 3(c)(1)(D); S. 1490 § 315; S. 139 § 6. 
98 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(f) (2009) (requiring notification to the 
Attorney General where 1,000 or more consumers are involved). 
99 Bruce E. H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, Recent Developments in Commercial 
Speech and Consumer Privacy Interests, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, 
AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 53, 69 (2008). 
100 Id. 
101 Chris Soghoian, Industry Giants Lobby To Kill Pro-Consumer Data-Breach 
Legislation, CNET NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9865076 
-46.html. 
102 Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. of Cal., to the Members of the Cal. 
State Senate (Oct. 10, 2009) (vetoing S. 20), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/ 
09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_20_vt_20091011.html. 
103 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009). 
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media,104 and S. 3579 requires “covered entities” to notify: (1) a 
designated federal agency; (2) a law enforcement agency; and 
(3) any entity that owns “a financial account to which the 
[personal information] relates.”105 
States have gone different ways with regard to when 
notification must be sent.  In California, whereas Owners must 
notify residents “in the most expedient time possible and without 
unreasonable delay,”106 Maintainers must notify the Owners 
“immediately.”107  Delays to accommodate the “needs of law 
enforcement [in conducting a criminal investigation] . . . or . . . to 
determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable 
integrity of the data system” are considered reasonable.108  A few 
states have declined to follow California’s approach, deciding 
instead on a bright line rule.  For example, Florida and Ohio both 
require notification within forty-five days.109 
With respect to timing, the Senate bills and the  
Senate-House bills have taken different paths.  The Senate bills 
retain California’s vague language, requiring businesses to 
deliver notification “without unreasonable delay following the 
discovery . . . of a security breach.”110  As in California, delays to 
accommodate the need to “determine the scope of the security 
breach, prevent further disclosures, and restore the reasonable 
integrity of the data system” or to accommodate the needs of law 
enforcement are considered reasonable.111  The House-Senate 
bills, on the other hand, make an attempt at clarification, 
requiring businesses to provide notice within sixty days absent 
“extraordinary circumstances,” while still accommodating the 





104 S. 1490, 111th Cong. §§ 313(2), 316 (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. §§ 4(2), 7 
(2009). 
105 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(1)(C) (2010). 
106 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010). 
107 Id. § 1798.82(b). 
108 Id. § 1798.82(a). 
109 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(a) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(B)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2010) (covering government agencies); id. § 1349.19(B)(2) (covering 
private entities). 
110 S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 311(c)(1) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2009).  
111 S. 1490 § 311(c)(2), (d); S. 139 § 2(c)(2), (d). 
112 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2009). 
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S.3579 has failed to address this topic, giving federal agencies 
the power to issue regulations regarding the standards that 
should apply.113 
4. How Individuals Must Be Notified and What Information 
Must Be Included in the Notification 
Any data breach notification law must address the manner 
in which notification may be given.  California’s statute provides 
that notification may be given via “written notice” or via 
“electronic notice.”114  The same is said in the House-Senate 
bills.115  S. 3579 and the Senate bills similarly allow notice to be 
given in writing or via e-mail and additionaly permit  notice by 
telephone.116   
In California, “substitute notice” is permitted if the entity 
“demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would exceed 
[$250,000], or that the affected class of subject persons to be 
notified exceeds 500,000, or the [entity] does not have sufficient 
contact information” to provide direct notice.117  “Substitute 
notice” consists of an e-mail, a “conspicuous” posting on the 
entity’s website, and notification to statewide media.118  The 
House-Senate bills also allow for “substitute notice” but only in 
narrow circumstances—when the database in question contains 
the information of fewer than 1,000 people and direct notification 
cannot be given due to excessive cost or a “lack of sufficient 
contact information for the individual required to be notified.”119  
According to the House-Senate bills, the notification need only 
inform consumers that they may receive two years of free credit 
reports in certain circumstances and a telephone number by 
which they can learn if their personal information has been 
compromised.120  S. 3579 also allows for “substitute notice,” but it 
is less clear than the House-Senate bills, leaving the details to 
federal agencies to regulate.121  The Senate bills contain no 
provision allowing for “substitute notice.” 
 
113 See S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (2010). 
114 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (g)(1)–(2) (West 2010). 
115 S. 3742 § 3(d)(1)(A); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(1)(A). 
116 S. 3579 § 4(c)(2)(A); S. 1490 § 313(1)(B); S. 139 § 4(1)(B). 
117 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (g)(3). 
118 Id. 
119 S. 3742 § 3(d)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
120 S. 3742 § 3(d)(2)(C); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(2)(C). 
121 See S. 3579 § 4(c)(2)(B).  
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State statutes vary with regard to what information must be 
included in the notice.  On this subject, California is silent.122  
Therefore, the letters and e-mails sent to California residents do 
not need to be very specific.  Specific disclosure is only required 
upon the affected resident’s request.123  Other states have filled in 
this gap, requiring businesses to provide affected individuals 
with descriptions of the breach, the types of personal information 
compromised, contact information for consumer reporting 
agencies, and various tips on how to prevent identity theft.124 
On this subject, the House and Senate seem to agree that 
California’s law is too vague.  The House-Senate bills provide 
that notification must include: (1) a description of the personal 
information compromised; (2) a telephone number for the 
business; (3) notice that the individual may receive two years of 
free credit reports in certain circumstances; (4) the addresses and 
toll-free numbers for credit reporting agencies; and (5) the 
website and the toll-free number for the FTC.125  Similarly the 
Senate bills require that each notice include:  
(1) a description of the categories of sensitive personally 
identifiable information that was, or is reasonably believed to 
have been . . . acquired by an unauthorized person; (2) a toll-free 
number [through which the individual can contact the business 
for more information]; and (3) the toll-free contact telephone 
numbers and addresses for the major credit reporting 
agencies.126 
In addition, individual states may require the inclusion of 
information regarding “victim protection assistance” provided in 
their particular states.127  Once again, the drafters of S. 3579 
declined to take the initiative in this area, leaving much of the 
planning to federal agencies; nevertheless, they do require that 
there be: (1) a description of the personal information that was  
 
 
122 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82. 
123 Id. § 1798.83(a). 
124 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.2(5) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 14-3504(g) (West 2010). 
125 S. 3742 § 3(d)(1)(B); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(1)(B). Here, the language in the two 
bills diverges slightly with S. 3742 also requiring that the notice contain “the date, 
estimated date, or estimated date range of the [security breach].” S. 3742 
§ 3(d)(1)(B)(i).  
126 S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 314(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2010).  
127 S. 1490 § 314(b); S. 139 § 5(b).  
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breached; (2) a description of what the business has done to 
secure that information; and (3) a summary of the victim’s 
rights.128 
5. The Penalties for Failing To Notify Affected Individuals 
Another subject of contention is whether individuals should 
be allowed a private right of action against businesses that fail to 
notify them of a security breach.129  Allowing a private right of 
action can create an increased incentive for businesses to comply 
with state law; however, the benefits to plaintiffs are limited.  
These lawsuits are usually based on claims of negligence or 
breach of contract.130  Therefore, plaintiffs are required to show 
more likely than not that the breach—the failure to notify—
caused the plaintiff’s injuries.131  This places an extremely heavy 
burden on the plaintiff.  California permits any customer injured 
by a violation of the notification law to sue the offending business 
and recover damages.132  In addition to California, ten states and 
the District of Columbia allow a private right of action,133 but in 
many states, only the state attorney general may sue for a failure 
to comply.134   
None of the federal bills allow for a private right of action.  
The Senate bills, however, do allow the United States Attorney 
General to bring a civil action against businesses that violate the 
act for damages not to exceed $1,000 per day, per individual up to 
a maximum of $1,000,000 per violation.135  In addition, the 
Attorney General may apply to the court to enjoin businesses 
from violating the statute’s requirements.136  The Senate bills 
also allow state attorneys general to bring actions against 
businesses when they believe that “an interest of the residents of 
[their] State[s] has been or is threatened or adversely affected by 
the engagement of a business entity in a practice that” violates 
 
128 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4(d) (2010).  
129 See Skinner, supra note 32, at 14. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West 2010). 
133 SCOTT P. COOPER ET AL., State Privacy Laws, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY 
2010, § 5:5.5[B][9] (PLI 2010) (District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and Washington). 
134 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(6)(a) (McKinney 2010). 
135 S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 317(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2010). 
136 S. 1490 § 317(b); S. 139 § 8(b).  
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the act.137  However, no state attorney general may bring such an 
action at the same time as the United States Attorney General.138  
The penalties for violating House-Senate bills are similar to the 
penalties in the Senate bills.  However, the FTC, rather than the 
Attorney General, would commence the civil action,139 and the 
maximum civil penalty cannot exceed $5,000,000.140  
Furthermore, according to the House-Senate bills any violation 
would be treated as an “unfair and deceptive act” under 
15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B).141  S. 3579 relies on administrative 
enforcement and precludes state attorneys general from 
instituting civil or criminal actions.142 
II. ANALYZING LOBBYISTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON PREEMPTION 
With regard to lobbyists and special interests, the main 
debate is whether a federal data breach notification law should 
preempt the many state laws currently in place.143  Once again, 
this Note argues that a strict federal data breach notification law 
that preempts state laws will provide increased protection to 
consumers in the United States.  
While industry groups and consumer protection groups 
support the creation of a federal law,144 the latter do not want 
states to lose the power to enact stricter protections than the 
 
137 S. 1490 § 318; S. 139 § 9. 
138 S. 1490 § 318(c); S. 139 § 9(c).  
139 S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2009). 
140 S. 3742 § 4(c)(2)(C)(ii); H.R. 2221 § 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). 
141 S. 3742 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 2221 § 4(b)(1). 
142 S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 5 (2010). 
143 See Lee, supra note 13, at 143–44.  
144 See Letter on S. 1490, supra note 21 (“The U.S. has a national economy, and 
almost every state has enacted various data security and breach notification 
provisions, many of which differ from one another in material ways. A federal 
security breach notification standard that is not only inconsistent with these laws, 
but also with other federal laws would create regulatory uncertainty and require 
notification in circumstances where individuals face no risk of identity theft or 
financial harm.”); Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21 (“We [the undersigned leading 
consumer groups] applaud the sponsors for including in the bill some of the 
strongest public policy provisions of any bill before the Congress to address the 
myriad data security and privacy problems that have been identified following years 
of well-publicized security breaches at some of the nation’s largest firms.”); Letter 
from Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Acting Director, ACLU, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, 
Sen. Judiciary Comm. & Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member of Sen. Judiciary Comm. 6 
(Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ltr_support_S1490.pdf 
(“We support S. 1490 because it is a common sense effort to regulate an industry 
that desperately needs it.”). 
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federal government.145  On the industry side, the Securities 
Industry Association, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., and 
Microsoft have all expressed their support for federal 
legislation.146  These groups hope to increase certainty and reduce 
the confusion that comes with complying with so many state 
laws.147  They hope to secure a weak federal law that preempts 
state laws.148   
On the other side of the debate are consumer protections 
groups, which, in true Jeffersonian fashion, do not want a federal 
law to preempt the various state laws.149  According to groups 
such as the Center for Digital Democracy, the U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (“PIRG”), the Consumer Federation of 
America, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, a “federal law should always serve as a 
floor, not a ceiling.”150  These groups argue that the states provide 
a valuable laboratory for the creation of public policy and should 
not be prohibited from experimenting.151   
 
145 Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21 (“[T]he bill . . . includes unacceptable 
preemptive language . . . , despite strong evidence that the states have led . . . on 
identity theft and other privacy protection issues.”). 
146 Lee, supra note 13, at 143–44. 
147 See id.  
148 See Letter on S. 1490, supra note 21 (“We [the undersigned industry groups] 
believe that this legislation should exempt entities covered by other federal security 
breach and data security laws and that the preemption standards should explicitly 
preempt all state laws relating to any activity covered under this Act.”). The private 
sector has spent a lot of money fighting on this issue. When the Lobbying Disclosure 
Act Database is searched, ChoicePoint, eBay Inc., Bank of America, N.A., and 
Microsoft are just a few of the entities that appear. Although these filings do not 
indicate which side of the debate these entities are on, it is clear that many large 
private sector entities are willing to spend on this issue. In 2006, the year after it 
suffered that devastating breach, ChoicePoint reported that it spent $588,000 
lobbying on its own behalf regarding data breach legislation in both the House and 
the Senate. That same year, eBay Inc. reported spending more than $1,085,000 on 
lobbying. Some of this money was spent on bills introduced in the 109th Congress to 
address data security. Bank of America, N.A., which spent a total of $1,020,000 in 
the second half of 2006, reports spending money on some of the same bills. The 
Lobbying Disclosure Act Database can be found at http://soprweb.senate.gov/ 
index.cfm?event=choosefields.  
149 Lee, supra note 13, at 143. 
150 Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21. 
151 Id.; see also Flora J. Garcia, Note, Data Protection, Breach Notification, and 
the Interplay Between State and Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time, 17 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 693, 726 (2007) (“State laws are 
beginning to address the remedies at the roots of the malady, the laissez-faire 
attitudes of some companies and agencies about data security and protection, and a 
marketplace with many different approaches is a robust test of what the best 
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Unfortunately, this debate has hindered the development of 
a federal data breach notification law for too long.  As already 
stated, the myriad of state laws currently in place has created a 
complex legal environment for businesses that are victims of 
security breaches.  As victims, businesses should not be forced to 
bear all the costs.152  If a federal law does not come to fruition, 
businesses will continue to be hounded with complicated 
questions resulting from a thorny statutory scheme.  In an age 
where e-commerce and the Internet have become important 
means of conducting business, such complications severely 
increase the costs of operating in the United States and lead to 
uncertainty and hesitation. 
The debate over a federal data breach notification law is not 
necessarily the best arena for ensuring that businesses take on 
the proper burden.  Although the private sector is in the best 
position to prevent security breaches from happening,153 it is 
difficult to determine whether notification laws have actually had 
a significant impact on reducing the occurrence of breaches.154  
 
remedies will be at this still-nascent point in the development of electronic data 
storage.”). This is a common argument in the arena of consumer protection law. For 
instance, professors of consumer law and banking law who support the creation of a 
federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency argue that the merits of preemption 
are outweighed by the value of having states operate as laboratories . . . . It 
is important that Congress not take a simplistic approach favoring only 
federal development of consumer protection laws . . . ; and that Congress 
not limit the role of the states to enforcement of state and federal law. 
State legislatures and courts need to be able to continue to develop 
consumer protection law . . . . In addition, problems are much more likely to 
grow larger if they can be addressed only at the federal level and not also 
by states where they first appear. 
Richard M. Alderman et al., A Communication from Academic Faculty Who Teach 
Courses Related to Consumer Law and Banking Law at American Law Schools 5 
(Sept. 29, 2009), http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf. 
152 See Lilia Rode, Comment, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes: 
Does Placing the Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1627 (2007). 
153 Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform 
Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 390 (2006). 
154 See S. Kasim Ravzi, Comment, To What Extent Should State Legislatures 
Regulate Business Practices as a Means of Preventing Identity Theft?, 15 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 639, 657–58 (2005). A study on breach notifications conducted by the 
Ponemon Institute revealed that thirty-nine percent of respondents believed the 
notification was “junk mail, spam or a telemarketing phone call” and that fifty 
percent of the respondents still did nothing new to protect themselves against 
identify theft. Ponemon Inst. LLC, National Survey on Data Security Breach 
Notification 10, 17 (2005), available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/ 
CP_Tom (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:11 PM 
1592 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1569   
Advances in technology and the development of new business 
practices have also had an effect.155  Therefore, lobbyists’ energies 
may be better spent in areas that will increase the use of such 
technologies and practices.   
In addition, fighting preemption has left the residents of 
some states completely unprotected.  Even now, over four years 
after the ChoicePoint breach, businesses in four states—
Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota—are not 
required to notify individuals when their personal information 
has been compromised.  Even though two of these states, 
Alabama and Kentucky, reported that in 2007, Internet related 
complaints were among the top ten consumer complaints 
received by their attorneys general,156 legislators in these states 
remain idle.  Although “[s]tate legislatures . . . need to be able to 
continue to develop consumer protection law,”157 in general, the 
experiment should be over with regard to notification.  Congress 
should not have to wait until these states decide to protect their 
consumers when it has the ability to protect them now. 
III. THE COMPROMISE: A STRICT DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION 
LAW THAT PREEMPTS STATE LAWS 
The best way to protect consumers’ personal information is 
to implement a strict federal data breach notification law that 
preempts the forty-six state laws currently in place.  A strict 
federal law would increase incentives for businesses to comply by 
reducing the cost of compliance and increasing the reputational 
harm associated with security breaches.  Increased notification 
gives consumers more control over their own personal 
information.  The following discussion is broken up into two 
parts.  Part A discusses the goal of this law—increased consumer 
control.  Part B revisits the five major elements of a data breach 
notification law, making recommendations on the form each 




155 Ravzi, supra note 154. 
156 REECE RUSHING, ARI SCHWARTZ & ALISSA COOPER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
& CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ONLINE CONSUMERS AT RISK AND THE ROLE OF 
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 9 (2008), available at http://cdt.org/privacy/ 
20080812_ag_consumer_risk.pdf. 
157 Alderman et al., supra note 151, at 5.  
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A. The Goal: Increasing Consumers’ Ability To Control Their 
Personal Information 
A strict federal data breach notification law will increase 
consumers’ ability to control their personal information.  In the 
context of informational privacy,  
[c]ontrol . . . refers to the fact that it is in many respects in a 
person’s hands—and in other respects she can at least guess—
what others know about her in any particular instance, that she 
can thus make well-founded assumptions concerning what the 
people or institutions she deals with know about her, and that 
in accordance with these assumptions and expectations she may 
also possess corresponding possibilities for penalizing or at least 
criticizing infractions.158 
Increasing consumer control involves two important policy 
goals.  First, a consumer can only have control over his or her 
personal information if he or she knows who is in possession of it; 
therefore, increased control requires increased disclosure.  
Disclosure “helps the market to function properly by assisting 
customers when choosing whether to deal with (or stop dealing 
with) a particular institution.”159  Without a strict law, most 
businesses will disclose as little as possible.160  They do not want 
to see their revenue decrease after “40% of consumers consider[ ] 
discontinuing their relationship with [them].”161  Thus, any 
federal law must contain language ensuring that businesses do 
not have a way of escaping their notification requirements.  In 
addition, it must be specific about what information businesses 
are required to disclose.  The more detail included in the 
notification, the more control a person has over his or her 
personal information.  An added benefit of increased disclosure is 
that it will aid in deterring hackers and identity thieves from 
violating the law.162  If individuals are put on notice that their 
personal information has been accessed, they will be much more 
vigilant, reviewing their banking statements and ordering credit 
reports.  Because notified individuals are more likely to report 
discrepancies, hackers are more likely to get caught. 
 
158 BEATE ROSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 111 (2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
159 Janger & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 234.  
160 See Amant, supra note 50, at 523–24. 
161 Id. at 517. 
162 Id. at 524. 
CP_Tom (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:11 PM 
1594 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1569   
Second, increased control requires that the federal 
government give businesses more of an incentive to improve 
security by increasing reputational costs.163  Statistical analyses 
show that “[t]he challenged macroeconomic backdrop” is causing 
companies to cut back in all areas, including security.164  
Companies continue to reduce information security budgets and 
many do not have privacy programs in place.165  This is occurring 
even though many system attacks are not difficult to prevent.166  
Poor information security leads not only to an increased number 
of breaches but also to long delays in determining how the breach 
occurred.  Although there is no statistically significant data 
proving that data breach laws reduce levels of fraud and identity 
theft,167 strict statutes still have the ability to encourage 
businesses to take preventative measures to prevent the 
reputational harm that results from a breach.  A lax federal 
notification law, on the other hand, will do nothing to increase 
investment in security.  Instead, it will signal to businesses that 
the federal government is not concerned about consumer privacy.   
B. Recommendations for a Federal Law 
Keeping the goal of increasing consumer control in mind, 
this Part revisits the five major elements of a data breach 
notification law: (1) the definition of “security breach” and the 
element of harm; (2) the definition of “personal information”; 
(3) who must be notified and when delivery must be completed; 
 
163 See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data 
Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 929 (2007), for more on reputational costs. 
164 See, e.g., DELOITTE, LOSING GROUND: 2009 TMT GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEY 3 
(2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Norway/Local%20Assets/ 
Documents/tmt_securitysurvey2009.pdf. 
165 See id. at 5 (noting that, among the surveyed companies, thirty-two percent 
reduced their information security budget, while twenty-five percent raised their 
budget less than five percent). These declining or minimally increasing security 
investments may not be enough to keep pace with the growing list of challenges, 
emerging technologies, and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Baker et al., supra 
note 26, at 39 (finding that only twenty-eight percent of victims had an incident 
response system in place). 
166 See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 3 (“Most of these incidents do not require 
difficult or expensive preventative controls; mistakes and oversight hinder security 
efforts more than a lack of resources.”). 
167 See Alana Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the World from 
California to Australia (Univ. of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, 
Paper 11, 2009), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153 
&context=unswwps. 
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(4) how individuals must be notified and what information must 
be included in the notification; and (5) the penalties for failing to 
notify affected individuals.168 
1. The Definition of a “Security Breach” and the Element of 
Harm 
With regard to what level of harm should trigger 
notification, California’s approach with a slight modification is 
still the best way to increase disclosure while retaining the 
important incentive of reputational harm.  California’s statute 
provides that unauthorized acquisition or a “reasonable belief” 
that unauthorized acquisition has occurred is enough for the 
statute’s notice requirements to apply.169  Despite criticisms that 
a broad trigger will increase attacks by phishers—criminals who 
send fraudulent e-mails to gather the personal information of 
unsuspecting individuals—it is inevitable that illegitimate 
companies will try to gather consumers’ personal information in 
an attempt “to exploit those who they perceive as being 
vulnerable to attack.”170  Opportunistic criminals will do this 
whether or not a federal data breach notification law is passed.  
Therefore, such criticisms should not be a reason for blocking the 
passage of a federal law. 
To reduce the vagueness of California’s language, any 
proposed federal statute should include factors for determining 
when there is a “reasonable belief” that unauthorized acquisition 
has occurred.  Although this stops short of requiring an 
additional element of harm, it narrows the trigger language and 
helps clarify the law.  The factors presented in New York’s 
statute would be a good starting point.  Once again, the factors 
are: 
(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession 
and control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen 
computer or other device containing information; or 





168 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
169 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010). 
170 ANDREW SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW § 25:2 (2010). 
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copied; or (3) indications that the information was used by an 
unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or 
instances of identity theft reported.171 
However, businesses should not be in control of weighing 
these factors.172  Giving businesses this power without oversight 
would be tantamount to applying the business-judgment rule in a 
situation where businesses clearly have an interest in self-
preservation.173  An exemption allowing entities to conduct their 
own investigation to determine whether there is a “significant 
risk of harm,”174 though favorable to industry lobbyists, would 
likely severely decrease the number of instances in which 
notification is required.  Thus, consumer protection groups are 
justified in their “dislike [of] trigger language that narrows 
notification to occurrences where there is a reasonable belief of a 
significant risk of identity theft because . . . the standard would 
allow companies to notify only certain select individuals, leaving 
others at risk.”175  According to the Consumer Program Director 
of PIRG, “[t]he fact that the company doesn’t yet know whether 
or how the information will be misused should not be enough to 
excuse notice.”176 
The last word on whether there is a reasonable belief of 
unauthorized acquisition should be with a new federal agency 
specializing in investigating security breaches rather than with 
the businesses themselves.177  The FTC currently does not have 
enough authority to take on this role because its jurisdiction is 
limited—other federal agencies have jurisdiction over entities 
such as financial institutions.178  This new agency must be 
equipped with the resources and technology to make 
determinations within a relatively short period of time and must 
 
171 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2010). 
172 See Amant, supra note 50, at 506. 
173 The business-judgment rule is the “presumption that in making business 
decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on 
an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the 
corporation’s best interest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (9th ed. 2009). 
174 A similar exemption is present in the Senate bills. See discussion supra Part 
I.B.1. 
175 Lee, supra note 13, at 145. 
176 Edmund Mierzwinski, Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups on Data 
Security, Data Breach Notices, Privacy and Identity Theft, at 330, 340 (PLI Corp. 
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 8565, 2006). 
177 See SERWIN, supra note 170. 
178 See id. 
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be given the power to enforce its decisions.  Otherwise, 
consumers will bear the costs of not being notified until it is too 
late.  Adding this extra level of review will increase consumer 
protection by ensuring that businesses suffering from a breach 
comply with the law.  Businesses will not be allowed to make 
their own exceptions.   
Critics arguing that the absence of a harm requirement will 
lead to over-notification and unnecessary increases in the cost of 
doing business presume that the benefits of over-notification do 
not exceed the costs.179  In fact, the opposite is true.  First, 
requiring an element of harm has not been able to prevent the 
public from becoming desensitized to notification letters.  Junk 
mail already inundates American mailboxes, and half of the 
public ignores notification letters.180  It is unlikely that a federal 
law will change these problems.  Thus, all things being equal, a 
federal law with a broad trigger will increase the number of 
consumers that are aware that their information has been 
compromised.  Second, although some analysts argue that a 
broad trigger will discourage disclosure by increasing 
reputational risk,181 this problem is rectified by requiring a 
federal agency to review whether there is a “reasonable belief” of 
unauthorized acquisition.  This agency would be able to overcome 
businesses’ reluctance to comply by enforcing the federal law and 
perhaps even by conducting audits of businesses’ data breach 
procedures.  Ultimately, a broad trigger will ensure that those 
who should receive notification do receive notification, thereby 
increasing disclosure, promoting knowledge, and improving 
consumers’ control over their personal information. 
2. The Definition of “Personal Information” 
As discussed above, there are two main issues that arise 
with regard to the definition of “personal information”—
(1) whether the statute should protect only computerized data; 
and (2) whether the definition of “personal information” is 
sufficiently broad to protect consumers from identity theft.182  
With regard to the first issue, PIRG maintains that it will not 
 
179 See Amant, supra note 50, at 524. 
180 See Rode, supra note 152, at 1626. 
181 See, e.g., Janger & Schwartz, supra note 11 (suggesting that fear of liability 
may encourage nondisclosure). 
182 See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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support any federal law unless it covers both electronic and 
paper data.183  PIRG’s request is reasonable.  Because “personal 
information” remains sensitive whether it is on paper or saved on 
a computer hard drive, it makes no sense to protect one form of 
information and not the other.  Businesses are in the best 
position to make sure that all the personal information they 
collect is stored safely and disposed of properly.  Therefore, 
Massachusetts’s statute, which covers “[a]ny material upon 
which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic 
information or images are recorded or preserved, regardless of 
physical form or characteristics,”184 is a good model for the federal 
law to follow. 
With regard to the second issue, a strict federal law must 
contain a flexible definition of “personal information” to be 
effective.  Many types of information can lead to identity theft.  
Thus, the law must be able to adapt when criminals change 
targets.185  For example, an e-mail address in combination with a 
mother’s maiden name, could reasonably allow a hacker to access 
an individual’s personal account on various websites, including 
those used for banking and insurance.186  Because a reasonable 
business should conclude that the unauthorized acquisition of an 
individual’s e-mail address in combination with a mother’s 
maiden name could lead to identity theft, this information  
should be protected by federal law.  In this instance, a simple 
notification letter would give consumers control over their 
personal data by prompting them to change their account 
passwords and their security questions.  None of the federal bills 
in the 111th Congress addressed this issue. 
One way to keep the definition flexible is to adopt a  
modified version of New York’s general definition of “personal 
information.”  “Personal information” should be defined as “any 
information concerning a natural person which, because of name, 
 
183 See Lee, supra note 13, at 144. 
184 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 1(a) (West 2010).  
185 See Baker et al., supra note 26 (“As supply has increased and prices have 
fallen, criminals have had to overhaul their processes and differentiate their 
products in order to maintain profitability.”). 
186 Many websites have a “forgot password?” link, allowing the user to enter an 
e-mail address and “security question,” such as “what is your mother’s maiden 
name,” when they have forgotten their personal password. The organization then 
sends the user a new password through their e-mail address. Anyone who knows the 
user’s e-mail address and the answer to the user’s security question can then gain 
access to the user’s account. 
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number, personal mark, or other identifier, can reasonably be 
used to identify such natural person.”187  The law should also 
enumerate types of data that are per se “personal information.”  
Social security numbers, state identification card numbers, 
driver’s license numbers, and account numbers along with any 
necessary codes or passwords needed to access the accounts, 
should all be included on this list.  In addition, the new federal 
agency discussed above should be given leave to add other 
sensitive categories of information to this list by issuing separate 
regulations.188  In this way, federal agencies, the courts, and the 
legislature will be given the flexibility to adjust the definition of 
“personal information” as necessary to accommodate changes in 
technology and new trends in identity theft.   
3. Who Must Be Notified and When Delivery Must Be 
Completed 
In Part I.B.3, this Note explored how data breach 
notification statutes, following California’s statute, have split 
responsibilities between Owners and Maintainers.189  Any federal 
data breach notification law should replicate California’s model.  
California has allocated responsibilities the most efficiently by 
requiring that Owners notify all residents whose personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired 
by an unauthorized person, while Maintainers are only required 
to inform the Owners.190  This prevents inefficiencies and 
provides a clear separation of duties.  The federal bills do not 
meaningfully improve on this language.  By overlapping the 
duties of Owners and Maintainers, Congress would cause 
confusion, forcing Owners and Maintainers to battle over who is 
responsible for sending notification.191 
In addition to requiring that notification be given to 
individuals, a strict federal law should also require that 
notification be given to both consumer reporting agencies and the 
Attorney General.  Requiring that notification be sent to both of 
these entities would create a centralized place where information 
on data breaches could be collected and studied.  In addition, it 
 
187 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added). 
188 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
189 See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
190 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a)–(b) (West 2010). 
191 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.  
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would increase businesses’ compliance with the law.  Recently, 
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill that 
would have amended California’s statute to require businesses to 
notify the state attorney general in the event that a breach 
involved the information of more than 500 individuals.192  
According to the Governor, “there is no additional consumer 
benefit gained by requiring the Attorney General to become a 
repository of breach notices when this measure does not require 
the Attorney General to do anything with the notices.”193  Despite 
the Governor’s objections, this requirement would put little 
added burden on businesses and would make the attorney 
general aware of possible sources of future litigation.  He or she 
may even want to investigate particularly egregious security 
breaches in order to decide whether or not to prosecute.  Because 
they will want to avoid the costs of litigation, both monetary 
costs and costs to their reputation, businesses faced with 
increased enforcement will be more likely to disclose information 
to the public in the event of a breach.   
Notification should be delivered “in the most expedient time 
possible and without unreasonable delay.”194  Even though this 
language is vague, the bright line sixty-day deadline set forth by 
the House-Senate bills195 may lead some businesses to delay 
notification so that they can take advantage of the full sixty days 
to either cover up the breach or investigate how best to notify 
consumers.  In cases of identity theft, time is of the essence.  The 
sooner consumers find out about the breach, the sooner they can 
take measures to protect their personal information.  Sixty days 
is a lot of time for a person to wait if his or her name and credit 
card number has been stolen.  Once again, a reviewing agency 
should be put in place to ensure that businesses are not delaying 
notification for selfish reasons.  This oversight will strengthen 
and correct the vague language of the statute and increase 
consumer protection. 
 
4. How Individuals Must Be Notified and What Information 
 
192 Nathan Taylor & Christine E. Lyon, California Governor Vetoes Enhanced 
Security Breach Notification Bill, MONDAQ, Oct. 22, 2009. 
193 Id. 
194 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a). 
195 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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Must Be Included in the Notification 
Federal law should mandate that notification be made in 
writing.  This medium allows businesses to give consumers a 
complete record of what information has been breached and 
where they can go for more information.  The same can be said 
for notification by e-mail, but notification via e-mail opens 
individuals up to phishers.  Furthermore, individuals often have 
numerous e-mail accounts.  Often, the one that they give to 
businesses is one that they use for “junk e-mail.”  Therefore, 
notification via e-mail should be limited to only those 
circumstances in which notification in writing is not possible.   
Although businesses that notify via telephone are more 
likely to retain the loyalty of their customers,196 there are a 
number of problems with giving notice by this method.  An 
automated telephone message cannot respond to consumer 
questions; the affected consumer may not be home to receive the 
call, causing businesses to call again and again, and there may be 
too much information for the consumer to write down in a short 
period of time.  Furthermore, while opening another person’s 
mail is a crime, there is no guarantee that the person who 
answers the phone is actually the person who needs to be 
notified.  Thus, notification by telephone should not be permitted. 
In addition, “substitute notification” should be an option in 
situations where there is no way to contact the individual or 
individuals involved.  The Senate bills’ failure to provide for 
substitute notification is a serious oversight because businesses 
left with no way to contact consumers would not be required to 
send notification by other means.  Businesses that cannot contact 
the affected individuals should be required to notify state media 
or place a “conspicuous” posting on their websites.  This will 
heighten the statute’s “ ‘invisible hand’ effect,” whereby “each 
business independently looks after its own interests by imposing 
the level of security it believes necessary to insulate itself from 
liability.”197  The media can always be used as a weapon against a 
business’s reputation. 
 
196 See Rode, supra note 152, at 1629. 
197 Id. at 1629–30; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Breach Notice Laws: 
Evidence?, CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LICENSING & INFORMATION 
LAW (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/privacy-data-protection-and-
security-35-security-breach-notice-laws-evidence.html. 
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Businesses that use personalized letters are also more likely 
retain the loyalty of their customers;198 thus, states were smart to 
specify what information must be disclosed to consumers in the 
event of a breach.199  At minimum, consumers should be told: 
(1) what information has been breached; (2) how they can 
monitor their personal information; and (3) who they can contact 
to obtain more information.  Current laws that do not require 
specific disclosure open the door for abuse of the law.  Businesses 
that do not want to spend time updating their procedures to 
collect the information necessary for proper notification will give 
consumers little to no information regarding the breach, reducing 
consumers’ ability to protect their own personal information.  
Specific disclosure decreases consumers’ animosity and increases 
consumers’ ability to control their personal information because 
consumers that know what information has been acquired have a 
better chance at noticing the signs of identity theft and 
mitigating future damages. 
5. The Penalties for Failing To Notify Affected Individuals 
Any federal data breach notification statute should allow for 
a private right of action.  Fear of litigation is a strong factor in 
persuading businesses to comply.200  Major data breaches lead to 
lawsuits, which settle even where there is no proof of negligence 
or harm.201  These lawsuits can cost companies a lot of money in 
attorney fees, settlement agreements, and lost business.  Thus it 
makes sense to allow lawsuits based on a failure to notify, 
regardless of the likelihood that such cases will succeed.  
Businesses will be encouraged to disclose or face the possibility of 
having to pay out significant sums of money, motivating them to 
take preventative measures by increasing investment in 
improved technology and security programs. 
CONCLUSION 
A uniform data breach notification law that preempts the 
forty-six state laws currently in place would end many of the 
difficulties faced by businesses engaged in interstate commerce, 
while increasing consumers’ control over their own personal 
 
198 See Rode, supra note 152, at 1629. 
199 See discussion supra Part I.B.4. 
200 Picanso, supra note 153, at 373. 
201 Danzig et al., supra note 1, at 61. 
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information.  The law enacted must be strict.  It must increase 
the chances that businesses will disclose information to the 
public in the most expedient time possible in the event of a 
breach.  A federal data breach notification statute with language 
that provides for an acquisition based trigger, a broad definition 
of personal information and a private right of action will 
strengthen the incentives for businesses to invest in security and 
implement improved data protection procedures.  Furthermore, a 
federal agency should be put in charge of overseeing businesses’ 
determinations regarding whether a security breach has taken 
place and when notification is required.  The media, the U.S. 
Attorney General, and the new federal agency should all play a 
role in enforcing the law.  Residents of Alabama, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, and South Dakota should no longer have to wait for their 
states to provide them with the same protections that other 
residents of the United States currently enjoy.  Until Congress 
passes a federal data breach notification law, consumers in the 
United States will remain unprotected, while businesses bear the 
costs of a complicated state statutory scheme. 
 
